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non-negotiable) instrument. They do not constitute 'defects of title'
nor 'infirmities' in the instrument, nor do they in any wise discredit the
paper." Bigelow, Bills, Notes, and Checks, 3rd ed. p. 445- Under the
law merchant the indorsee after maturity of a negotiable instrument took
it subject only to equities attaching to or inherent in the instrument
itself at the time of the transfer and equities arising out of the instru-
ment which exist at the time of the transfer. Pusey & Jones Co. v.
Hansen, 279 Fed. 488 (C.C.A., 3rd C., 1922), reversed on other
grounds, 261 U.S. 491, 67 L.E. 763, 43 S. Ct. 454 (1922). Worden
v. Gillett, 275 Fed. 654 (D.C., S.D. Fla. 1921). The opinion in
Stegal v. Union Bank, 163 Va. 417, 176 S.E. 438 (I934) contains
an exhaustive discussion of the problem before and after the passage of
the Negotiable Instruments Law. The conclusion reached in that case
is that it could not have been the intention of the drafters of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law that defenses "should mean technical defenses
and offsets in one state, and technical defenses, but not offsets in an-
other," supra, p. 459. But it is probable that that is just what the
drafters did intend. When the Negotiable Instruments Law was sub-
mitted to the legislatures of the several states, the following note was
appended to section 58: "It is not deemed expedient to make provision
as to what equities the transferee will be subject to; for the matter may
be affected by the statutes of the various states relating to set-off and
counterclaim. On the question whether such equities may be asserted as
attach to the bill, or whether equities arising out of collateral matters
may also be asserted, the decisions are conflicting. In an act designed
to be uniform in the various states, no more can be done than fix the
rights of the holders in due course." Stegal v. Union Bank, supra,
P. 453. Evidently it was not thought important that the law as regards
holders not in due course should be uniform. Apart from the question
of the meaning of "defense" in section 58, it seems that the decision in
this case is correct and that the law as it stands does substantial justice.
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PROBATE PRACTICE
RIGHT OF JURY TO Fix THE TIME OF DEATH WHERE A PRE-
SUMPTION ARISES FROM SEVEN YEARS' UNEXPLAINED AB-
SENCE - POWER OF PROBATE COURT TO APPOINT AN
ADMINISTRATOR IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTE
John V. Phillips, an insurance agent, worked his regular territory
in Columbus on June 27, 1922, and was last seen that evening on the
street car which ordinarily took him to his home. Four days later, an
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insurance policy in his behalf and some other papers used by him in his
business were found floating in the Scioto River. He was a man of
integrity, had apparently lived a happy, normal life, and no facts of
any consequence were known to explain this sudden and complete dis-
appearance. Upon action filed in the Probate Court December 18,
1931, under General Code lO636-i et seq., Mr. Phillips was declared
dead in fact, the date of death being found by the court to be June 27,
1922, and an administratrix was appointed. The administratrix filed
an action in the Common Pleas Court to recover on four insurance
policies which Mr. Phillips had held in the company which employed
him. The jury, finding that Mr. Phillips was dead and that death had
occurred on June 27, 1922, returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Judg-
ment was entered accordingly on all four policies, including one which
specified that the insured must have been in the employ of the company
at the time of his death. In affirming the judgment, the Court of Ap-
peals said that it was within the province of the jury to fix the date of
death of the insured, and made the observation that without the aid of a
statute the Probate Court could have named an administrator on the
strength of the presumption of death arising from seven years' unex-
plained absence. Prudential Ins. Co. of A4merica v. Phillips, 20 Ohio
Abs. 228 (1935).
Whenever the fact of death becomes important and direct proof is
not obtainable, death must be established by circumstantial evidence.
The usual method is to establish facts giving rise to a presumption of
death. The common law rule is well established in Ohio and else-
where, that a person's continued and unexplained absence from home
without being heard from for a period exceeding seven years raises a
presumption of death. Rice v. Lumley, io Ohio St. 596 (1857);
Brent v. First, 41 Ohio St. 436 (1884); Young v. Young, io Ohio
App. 351 (1918) ; Ingram v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 37 Ga. App.
2o6, 139 S.E. 363 (1927); University v. Harrison, 9o N.C. 398
(1884); Whiting v. Nicholl, 46 Ill. 230 (1867); 2 Woerner, Am.
Law of Administration (3rd Ed.), 686, sec. 207. This rule was the
basis for the Ohio statute providing for the administration of the estate
of a presumed decedent. General Code 10509-25 et seq. (formerly
IO636-I et seq.). In the absence of facts tending to establish the time
of death, there is an equally important presumption that life continues
throughout the seven-year period. Goodier v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
158 Minn. I, 196 N.W. 662, 34 A.L.R. 1383 (1924); Supreme
Commandery v. Everding, 20 O.C.C. 689, II C.D. 419 (1893).
The generally accepted view seems to be that the presumption of death
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arises at the end of the seven-year period and is a presumption of law
relating only to the fact of death, the time of death, whenever it is
material, being a subject of distinct proof. Young v. Young, ante;
Supreme Commandery v. Everding, ante; Nepean v. Doe, 2 M. & W.
894, 15o Reprint 1021 (Eng., 1837); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v.
Marshall, 84 CoIo. 71, 268 Pac. 529, 61 A.L.R. 1321 (1928);
Peterson v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 134 Wash. 172, 235
Pac. 15 (1925); W'isconsin Trust Co. v. Wisconsin M. & F. Ins. Co.
Bank, 105 Wis. 464 (19oo); Ingram v. Met. Life Ins. Co., ante.
Such presumption does not ordinarily relate back to the date of disap-
pearance. Griffin v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 250 Mich. 185, 229
N.W. 509 (1930). However, facts which would not have been suf-
ficient to establish the fact of death so as to permit action during the
seven-year period, may be sufficient to sustain a finding fixing the date
of the decendent's death after the presumption from seven years' ab-
sence has sufficed to prove the fact of death. Linneweber v. Supreme
Council, C.K.zl., 30 Cal. App. 315, 158 Pac. 229 (1916); Bradley
v. M'Iodern Woodmen, 146 Mo. App. 428, 124 S.W. 69 (191o);
Lancaster v. W'Vashington Life Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 121, 128 (1876).
Any evidence tending to discredit any other explanation than that of
death, is admissible and may warrant the finding of death at a certain
time. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 207 Ky. 654,
269 S.XV. 1014 (1925). In Ohio, disappearance from shipboard has
been held sufficient to warrant a jury in finding that the presumed de-
cedent had died by drowning on the night he was last seen. Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Rosch, 3 O.C.C. (N.S.) 156, 13 C.D. 491, affirmed with-
out opinion in 69 Ohio St. 561, 70 N.E. 1133 (1902). Evidence of
integrity, steady habits of living, happy family relations, etc., may be of
aid in determining when death occurred. Butler v. Supreme Court,
I.O.F., 53 Wash. I18, IOI Pac. 481, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 294 (1909);
American Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 35 S. (2nd) 128, 75 A.L.R.
623 (Tex., 1931); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, ante. In
the principal case, on the basis of Phillips' good reputation and the finding
of his papers in the river, the Court of Appeals would seem to be fully
supported by authority in its decision upholding the finding by the jury
of the date of Phillips' death.
General Code IO636-4 provided for a determination by the Probate
Court of the date when the presumption of death arose. It was defi-
nitely decided, however, in Morrissey, 4dmr. v. Smith, 17 Ohio Abs.
240, 39 O.L.R. 329 (1933), noted in I OHIO ST. L.J. 126, 7 OHIO
BAR 68o (1935), that this statute was merely procedural in nature,
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that the common law rule of presumption of death was not abrogated
thereby, and that the time fixed by the Probate Court in pursuance
thereof could not conclude strangers to such judgment. It would seem,
therefore, that where some evidence is presented tending to indicate the
date of death, the right of a jury to set that date would not be affected
by Section 10509-28 of the new Probate Code. That section merely
provides that the presumption of death shall be regarded as having arisen
as of the date of the Probate Court's decree establishing the fact of
death. It does not purport to fix the date of death as of the date of
that decree.
The court's statement in the principal case relating to the power of
the Probate Court to appoint an administrator on the strength of the
common law presumption of death, in the absence of statute, gives rise
to more serious difficulty. Statutes similar to the one in Ohio, author-
izing the courts to appoint an administrator to take charge of property
abandoned by absentees, have been upheld. Cunnius v. Reading School
District, 198 U.S. 458, 25 S. Ct. 721, 49 L. Ed. 1125 (1905);
Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. I, 32 S. Ct. I, 56 L. Ed. 65, Ann. Cas.
1913 B, 555 (1911); Chamberlain v. Anderson, 195 Iowa 855, 190
N.W. 503, 26 A.L.R. 957 (1922); See: MINN. L. Rv. 89 (1925).
Such statutes, however, make due provision for the protection of the
presumed decedent's rights in case he should later prove to be alive.
Cases involving situations where the absentee has returned to claim his
property distributed under authority of the court have gone far to estab-
lish the invalidity of such proceedings when based upon the common law
presumption of death alone. The case of Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S.
34, 14 S. Ct. I1o8, 38 L. Ed. 896 (1894), established the rule that
it is not competent for a state, by statute or by the judgment of its highest
court, to make a judicial determination that a man is dead, made in his
absence and without any notice to or process issued against him, conclu-
sive for the purpose of divesting him of his property; such action would
violate the 14 th Amendment by taking property without due process of
law. On the basis of this authority, it was held in Beckwith v. Bates,
228 Mich. 400, 2oo N.W. 151, 37 A.L.R. 819 (1924), that there
can be no administration and distribution of the estate of an absentee
under the general laws relative to the administration of the estates of
deceased persons, and that such void probate proceedings can afford no
protection to the administrator as against the absentee. The admin-
istration of the estate of a living person, in the absence of a proper
statute, is void ab initio, for want of jurisdiction, not only as against
the supposed decedent himself, but as to all others who may choose to
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question it. See: Scott v. McNeal, ante; Thomas v. People, 107 Ill.
517, 47 Am. Rep. 458 (1883); 62 U. OF PA. L. REv. 605 (1914).
Perhaps the least that can be said in the ordinary case is that a court's
decree relating to the property of a presumed decedent must make pro-
vision for the protection of the property rights of such person in case
he should later prove to be living, otherwise it is void. Eddy v. Eddy,
302 Ill. 446, 134 N.E. 8O (1922). The contrary view has been ex-
pressed in Hamilton v. Orange Savings Bank, 99 N.J.L. 503, 124 Atd.
62 (1924), noted in 34 YALE L. J. 97 (1924), where it was held
that payment to an administrator, duly appointed by the court, of a per-
son presumed to be dead, was valid and conclusive as to collateral attack
whether or not such presumed decedent later proved to be living, on
the ground that debtors should not be made to risk paying their debts
twice.
The Ohio courts seem to be more nearly in accord with the view
of Michigan and Illinois. The common law presumption of death
is merely prima facie and is wholly rebutted, proceedings thereunder
being rendered void, whenever it is shown that the presumed decedent
is in fact alive. Youngs v. Heffner, 36 Ohio St. 232 (188o); Nichols
v. Clare, 32 O.C.A. 555, 35 C.D. 846, affirmed without opinion in
75 Ohio St. 6oo, 8o N.E. I 125 (19o6). Recognizing the importance
of this rule, the court in the Nichols case, as a condition to granting par-
tition of property in which the absentee had an interest, required that
a bond be given for repayment of the absentee's interest in the event of
his reappearance. The necessity of some such precaution was recog-
nized by the court in Morrissey, Admr. v. Smith, ante. Brent v. First,
ante, may be distinguished on its facts, since the absentee deserted his
wife and four children and the court felt the wife was entitled to his
money by reason of her right to a year's support.
In some jurisdictions, where the absentee did not return to com-
plicate matters, the courts have upheld administration granted on the
basis of the common law presumption of death. latter of Sanford,
ioo N.Y. App. Div. 479 (1905); Ferrell v. Grigsby, 51 S.W. 114
(Tenn., 1899).
The statement of the Court of Appeals in the principal case relating
to a court's jurisdiction to appoint an administrator based solely upon the
common law presumption of death, can hardly be applied to cases where
the presumed decedent later reappears. In the absence of statute, re-
appearance of the absentee renders the proceedings void ab initio.
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